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he period of reflection is over. 
Now it is for the member 
states’ experts and EU 
institutions to sculpt a readable, 
comprehensible and coherent legal 
entity out of the complex material 
that has been put on their desks. 
On the already voluminous but 
comparatively sublime Constitutional 
Treaty of 2004, the June 2007 
European Council has superimposed the mandate 
for the Intergovernmental conference (IGC 
Mandate)
1. This mandate is in itself complicated 
enough but it only forms the sketched outline from 
which a ‘non-constitutional’ Reform Treaty 
revisiting the already existing Treaties will be 
constructed, generating two ‘new’ treaties. The 
result will constitute the legal foundation upon 
which the EU as a political project will have to be 
built in the foreseeable future – always provided 
everything turns out as planned.
2
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Aspects related to the ‘Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice’ (AFSJ) - the EU label for Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) - will be among those 
experiencing a substantial institutional revision. 
This policy field has been notorious for its inability 
to respond to its specific challenges under the 
existing institutional framework. From many sides, 
substantial reform has long been considered urgent.  
By looking at the nature of the renewed institutional 
setting and the effects that the latter will have on the 
sustainability and crystallisation of an AFSJ, this 
Policy Brief assesses the major innovations brought 
about by the IGC Mandate to the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
As we will argue, one of the most relevant 
amendments compared to the present regime will be 
the formal scrapping of the Pillar division (EC First 
Pillar vs. EU Third Pillar).
3 In doing so, the Reform 
Treaty will provide a necessary and positive
4 
response to the deficiencies and vulnerabilities that 
characterise the current legal duality of Pillars. At 
the same time, however, the Mandate goes way 
beyond the ‘flexibility mechanisms’ already 
foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty and further 
opens the door for a considerable number of 
derogations from general rules. While there are 
different positions on these flexibility mechanisms, 
we see a tangible risk of ‘exceptionalism’ and 
‘differentiation’ that may have serious implications 
for the construction of a common Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice.
5
Equally, catchy and technocratic terms like 
‘emergency brakes’, ‘flexibility’, ‘enhanced 
cooperation’, ‘opt-ins’ and ‘opt-outs’, ‘two-speed 
Europe’ are ever present characteristics of this new 
institutional setting. In essence these mechanisms 
entail that in sensitive policy areas individual 
member states will be enabled to suspend (or stay 
entirely clear of) legislative procedures, paving the 
way for small groups of member states to go 
‘forward’ without the fortified participation of 
others and the EU as a whole. This ‘exceptionalism’ 
and ‘differentiation’ gives rise to a number of key 
questions: 
Is the Reform Treaty truly going to ‘de-
intergovernmentalise’ all the policies falling within 
the scope of an AFSJ, and hence put a material – 
not only a formal - end to the ‘Era of the Pillars’? Is 
the much-praised ‘flexibility’ not in fact likely to 
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create many ‘Areas’ with possibly different and 
even competing degrees, notions and ‘speeds’ of 
Freedoms, Securities and Justices? To what extent is 
the mainly positive connotation of moving ‘ahead’, 
moving ‘forward’ (as if European integration were a 
one way street) justified? How much moving 
‘ahead’ can the political project of an AFSJ bear 
before it moves ‘apart’? In short, and sticking to the 
Greek temple metaphor that has so far described the 
EU/EC construction: did we scrap the pillars only to 
construct a ‘mosaic’ (a ‘patchwork’) in the Areas of 
Freedoms, Securities and Justices?  
This paper is divided into three core sections: the 
first offers a concise overview of the most relevant 
innovations in the AFSJ. The second section 
assesses exceptions and derogations applicable to 
this renewed institutional architecture. The third 
section presents a critical analysis of the 
implications that may arise from the application of 
exceptions and differentiation in the building of a 
common European Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. Finally, we offer some conclusions and 
suggestions for policy-makers. 
I. The Mandate for a Reform Treaty: 
Innovations for an AFSJ 
The Reform Treaty will emerge from a combination 
of the amendments presented by the IGC Mandate 
along with those provisions that will survive from 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe as 
signed in Rome in October 2004 (the Constitutional 
Treaty).
6 The main innovations as regards the future 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice are 
highlighted here:  
1. The End of the Pillars 
The Reform Treaty will generate two separate 
bodies of law: an amended version of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU)
7 and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the Union (TFU).
 The TFU, which 
will be the new denomination
8 of the current Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC), will 
contain the new title: ‘Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice’, comprising five chapters and bringing 
together the currently dispersed
9 JHA policies under 
one heading.
10 As an outcome, the pillar division 
will be formally abolished. The direct consequence 
of this restructuring will be the expansion of what is 
- at present - called the ‘Community method’ to 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
2. The Procedural & Decision-Making 
Mechanisms 
The Reform Treaty will in principle create an 
improved decision-making procedure which will 
lead to a higher degree of efficiency, legal certainty, 
accountability and democratic control.  
First, as regards the decision-making processes, the 
standard procedure in the AFSJ will be co-decision 
(present Art. 251 TEC) with a Commission right of 
initiative and qualified majority voting (QMV) in 
the Council. In this way, the procedural 
amendments that had been proposed by the 
Constitutional Treaty will remain valid (Art. III-
396). Therefore, and in contrast to the current state 
of affairs, the co-decision procedure and QMV will 
apply to:  
٠  Police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters; 
٠  Legal migration and integration of third 
country nationals; 
٠  Measures dealing with those non EU nationals 
subject to visa requirements and rules on uniform 
format for visas. 
Second, there will be a common nomenclature of 
legal instruments. However, instead of using the 
innovative terms coined in the Constitutional Treaty 
(i.e. European laws, European framework laws, 
European regulations, etc.
11), the new structure will 
retain the traditional instruments of the EC First 
Pillar (regulations, directives, decisions, etc). The 
current EU Third Pillar instruments (framework 
decisions, common positions, conventions, etc) will 
disappear. The heterogeneity in the types of legal 
acts - product of the institutional duality 
characterising current FSJ policies – and negative 
effects in terms of their genuine nature and legal 
effects will therefore come to an end. This will in 
turn foster transparency and comprehension of the 
legislative procedures.
12
3. An Enhanced role for the European 
Parliament & National Parliaments 
As mentioned above, the general rule will be that 
the AFSJ acts will be subject to the co-decision 
procedure as currently foreseen in Art. 251 TEC and 
as revised by Art. III-396 of the Constitutional 
Treaty (the so-called ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’). At present, the European Parliament is 
still not sufficiently involved in the decision-making 
processes covering EU Third Pillar policies. The 
Reform Treaty will - in principle - provide a single 
legislative procedure that guarantees democratic 
accountability. This will respond to the democratic 
shortcomings that have so far characterised 
European cooperation on police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
Furthermore, the mandate foresees a strengthened 
involvement of national parliaments. Under the new 
Title II of the TEU - to be called ‘Provisions on 
Democratic Principles’ - national parliaments will 
take part in the evaluation mechanisms for the 
implementation of the Union’s AFSJ policies. In 
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this regard it is interesting to note that the IGC 
Mandate intends to slightly alter the wording of the 
relevant provision in comparison to the 2004 
Constitutional Treaty. While the latter provided in 
article I-42.2 that “National Parliaments may, within 
the framework of the area of freedom, security and 
justice, participate in the evaluation mechanisms” 
and “shall be involved in the political monitoring of 
Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities” 
(emphasis added), the IGC mandate states that 
“National parliaments shall contribute actively to 
the good functioning of the Union (…) by taking 
part, within the framework of the area of freedom, 
security and justice in the evaluation mechanisms 
(…) and through being involved in the political 
monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of 
Eurojust’s activities”
13 (emphasis added). This new 
wording seems to intend to provide an even stronger 
role of national parliaments than that foreseen in the 
Constitutional Treaty. 
In addition, the mandate goes beyond the 2004 
Constitutional Treaty in relation to national 
parliaments’ role in keeping watch over the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. There 
will be a “reinforced control mechanism of 
subsidiarity” so that “if a draft legislative act is 
contested by a simple majority of the votes allocated 
to national parliaments the Commission will re-
examine the draft act, which it may decide to 
maintain, amend or withdraw”.
14 If the Commission 
decides to maintain the draft act, a new specific 
procedure will be triggered that may eventually – 
depending on the Council’s and EP’s position on the 
matter – result in the dropping of the Commission’s 
draft act. Finally, the time period which national 
parliaments will have for the examination and 
delivery of opinions on the subsidiarity of draft 
legislative acts will be extended from 6 to 8 
weeks.
15
4. The Jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) 
Judicial control is critical for the protection and 
safeguarding of civil liberties, fundamental rights 
and the rule of law. This is particularly true in the 
context of transnational policies dealing with FSJ, as 
these entail many implications on the status of the 
individual that go beyond traditional ‘person-state’ 
relations within a nationally confined legal system. 
At present, the ECJ has no full jurisdiction over the 
measures activated within the AFSJ. In particular, it 
does not hold a per se recognised competence to 
review and interpret measures on judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation. Article 35 TEU foresees a high number 
of exceptions and alterations, among which is a 
merely voluntary declaration by member states as to 
whether to accept the jurisdiction of the Court,
16 the 
absence of individual standing to bring suit against 
certain measures as well as the absence of 
infringements proceedings instigated by the 
Commission against member states. 
In addition, deviations also exist under the umbrella 
of Title IV TEC (Visas, Asylum, Immigration and 
other policies related to free movement of persons). 
According to article 68 TEC, for example only last 
instance courts under national law are entitled to ask 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
The new institutional framework that is going to be 
provided by the Reform Treaty will grant the ECJ - 
in principle - general jurisdiction to interpret and 
review the validity of the acts adopted within any 
field of the AFSJ. Overall this will ensure a higher 
level of judicial control and protection in the EU. 
5. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The debate around the legal status of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Union will be – for the 
vast majority of member states - finally resolved.
17 
The new article 6 TEU will provide a cross-
reference to the Charter on Fundamental Rights “as 
agreed in the 2004 IGC”.
18 This will render the 
Charter directly legally binding for the European 
institutions, Union bodies, offices and agencies as 
well as member states when they implement Union 
law. 
This will put EU actors and member states under a 
clear legal obligation to ensure that in all their areas 
of activity – and in particular in the AFSJ - 
fundamental rights are duly respected. It will also 
reinforce the onus upon them to respect fundamental 
rights when legislating, implementing and practising 
these policies. Finally, the altered nature of the 
Charter will strengthen the freedom dimension of an 
AFSJ.
19
6. An EU with a Single Legal Personality 
As foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty, the Reform 
Treaty will recognise the European Union as a 
single legal personality. The new version of article 
6.2 TEU will additionally establish that the EU shall 
accede to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) of 1950. It will also contain the 
proviso that “Such accession shall not affect the 
Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties”. 
From an EU perspective, the eventual accession to 
the ECHR will require unanimity in the Council and 
ratification by member states. However, it must be 
kept in mind that accession by the EU to ECHR is 
not a unilateral act. In order to achieve this step, all 
47 ECHR signatory states will have to agree and 
certain amendments to the Strasbourg texts will be 
required.
20
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Further, fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
ECHR and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the member states, will 
continue to be considered as general principles of 
EU law. While accession to the ECHR would serve 
as an excellent reminder for member states of the 
obligations and commitments undertaken within the 
realm of the Council of Europe, careful attention 
will need to be paid as to the actual legal and 
judicial consequences of the changing relationship 
between the ECHR, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the national constitutions.
21
7. The European Public Prosecutor 
The possible establishment of a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust was already 
foreseen in article III-274 of the Constitutional 
Treaty. This has been kept by the mandate. The 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office will be a 
judicial body with direct enforcement authority, 
responsible for investigating, prosecuting and 
bringing to judgment offences against the Union’s 
financial interests. In this respect it will exercise the 
functions of prosecutor directly in the competent 
courts of the member states.  
While the term “offences against the Union’s 
financial interests” is as such already quite wide and 
imprecise, there will also be the possibility to extend 
the powers of this body to include “serious crimes 
having a cross-border dimension” (article III-274.4). 
A fully fledged European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
responsible for investigating and bringing to trial 
serious cross-border crime throughout the EU would 
be a quite fundamentally new and powerful actor in 
the area of judicial cooperation in the EU; its 
development therefore deserves close attention.
22
8. A Standing Committee on Internal 
Security 
Also in line with the Constitutional Treaty is the 
setting up of a standing committee within the 
Council “in order to ensure that operational 
cooperation on internal security is promoted and 
strengthened within the Union” (article III-261). 
According to the Constitutional Treaty, this standing 
committee – also known as COSI - will have the 
task of facilitating the coordination of the actions of 
member states’ competent authorities.  
Nevertheless, the composition, concrete tasks and 
competences of COSI remain as vague as they were 
three years ago, when the Constitutional Treaty was 
signed. That the EP and national parliaments “shall 
be kept informed of the proceedings” of COSI is 
only a minor remedy, as the obligation to mere 
information only highlights the fact that this 
potentially seminal committee will not be subject to 
genuine parliamentary control. In this respect, the 
IGC mandate should have addressed the concerns 
formulated by some observers.
23
9. Further aspects related to specific AFSJ 
policies 
Finally it is worth pinpointing a number of 
modifications to the Constitutional Treaty that the 
IGC Mandate intends to introduce. 
1. With regard to diplomatic and consular 
protection of EU citizens – one of the existing rights 
connected to the status of citizenship of the Union – 
it seems as if the IGC mandate has actually taken a 
step back. The Constitutional Treaty gave 
competence to the Council to adopt a European law 
(comparable to the existing regulation) to establish 
the “measures necessary to facilitate” diplomatic 
and consular protection (article III-127). The IGC 
mandate, in contrast, provides for the “adoption of 
directives establishing coordination and cooperation 
measures”
24 In both, the legal instrument (directive 
instead of regulation) and the scope (coordination 
and cooperation instead of facilitation of protection), 
the IGC mandate waters down the innovation of the 
Constitutional Treaty. But in comparison to the 
existing rules (see article 22.2 TEC: ratification 
necessary), this watered down innovation is 
nevertheless a step forward. 
2. The provision on financial sanctions - like the 
freezing of funds against entities or individuals 
suspected of having links with terrorism (known as 
targeted sanctions, smart sanctions, ‘terror lists’, 
etc.) - newly shaped by the Constitutional Treaty 
(article III-160) will be moved from the Treaty 
section on “Capital and Payments” to the one on the 
AFSJ.
25 The fact that a clear legal base for this 
counter-terrorism measure - that has already sparked 
many controversies in the ECJ - will be established, 
explicitly requesting the adoption of ‘legal 
safeguards’ – is to be welcomed. Yet, the shifting of 
this provision into the AFSJ section gives rise to 
suspicion: in the end, the opt-outs of the UK, Ireland 
or Denmark might now also take hold of this 
measure which before had been secured in the clear 
cut Treaty section on ‘Capitals and Payments”.
26
3. Finally another major innovation of the 
Constitutional Treaty affecting the AFSJ is likely to 
be hampered under the new structures. While the 
first would have guaranteed a common standard and 
common legislative procedures related to data 
protection in all policy fields (I-51), the IGC 
mandate is likely to reintroduce (i.e. maintain) 
different standards and procedures. According to 
para. 19 f) of the IGC Mandate, a specific legal 
basis for data protection in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy will be introduced as well as 
another sectoral declaration on data protection in the 
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field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.
27
II. Exceptions & Derogations to the 
Renewed Institutional Regime on FSJ 
After having illustrated the main trends and general 
principles that are to be expected from the new 
institutional setting, this second section will provide 
an overview of the high number of fundamental 
exceptions and derogative clauses that appear to 
become characteristics of  the new AFSJ. 
Among others:  
1.  Maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security will remain the 
sole responsibility of member states. As foreseen in 
the current article 64 TEC and III-262 of the 
Constitutional Treaty, the EU provisions on the 
AFSJ “shall not affect the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security”.  
However, the IGC mandate has introduced a new 
subparagraph stating that member states are free “to 
organize between themselves and under their 
responsibility forms of cooperation and coordination 
as they deem appropriate between the competent 
departments of their administrations responsible for 
safeguarding national security”. 
This new subparagraph reaffirms the exclusion of 
any EU involvement in the safeguarding of internal 
security, while explicitly allowing for 
intergovernmental cooperation and coordination. 
The old Third Pillar thinking becomes apparent and 
one wonders whether this provision is not in fact 
laying the ground for further extra-EU but trans-
European exercises like the famous Prüm Treaty.
28 
One wonders, furthermore, whether the IGC 
Mandate explicitly used a different term in this new 
subparagraph: national security instead of internal 
security and what further implications this choice of 
wording might have. 
2. At the same time administrative cooperation 
between the relevant departments of the member 
states ‘in all areas’ covered by the label AFSJ (apart 
from the ones just mentioned) will fall within the 
scope of the general institutional renewal. However, 
the European Parliament will be only consulted and 
the right of initiative will be shared between the 
member states and the European Commission.
29  
3. There will be a shared right of initiative between 
the European Commission and a quarter of the 
member States in judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, police cooperation and cooperation between 
administrative departments.
30 This is a partial 
exception to the rule that only the Commission shall 
be entitled to propose EU legislation. 
4. For the first time, the ordinary legislative 
procedure will apply to judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. While the UK has secured an opt-
out possibility of this innovation, Ireland will still 
have to decide on the matter.
31 These opt-outs go 
beyond what has been agreed under the 
Constitutional Treaty.
32
In addition to this, issues related to the 
establishment of minimum rules in criminal law 
(with the exception of matters concerning the 
principle of mutual recognition) will be subject to 
the mechanisms of ‘emergency brake’ and 
‘enhanced cooperation’. While the Constitutional 
Treaty already foresaw this possibility (see articles 
III-270 and III-271 respectively), the IGC Mandate 
has brought about an important amendment. 
What do these terms entail and what is the 
innovation introduced by the IGC Mandate? 
There will be the possibility of an ‘emergency 
brake’ if one member state considers that a draft 
legislative act may affect fundamental aspects of its 
criminal justice system. In this case the member 
state may request the draft to be referred to the 
European Council and the ordinary legislative 
procedure will be temporarily suspended. Whereas 
this possibility was already foreseen in article III-
271 of the Constitutional Treaty,
33 the mandate has 
modified this procedure in one crucial aspect, i.e. by 
abandoning the possibility for the European Council 
to request from the European Commission or the 
initiating group of member states the submittal of a 
new draft of the proposal. 
Further, the Mandate provides the possibility for at 
least one third of the member states (currently 
nine)
34 wishing to establish ‘enhanced cooperation’ 
to move onwards. Once the ‘emergency brake’ has 
been applied and the European Council is unable to 
find an agreement, a simple notification to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Commission will suffice to allow this group to 
establish enhanced cooperation on the basis of the 
initial draft proposal that gave rise to the suspension 
of the ordinary legislative procedure. 
An imaginary scenario might help to highlight 
possible ramifications and the underlying ratio of 
the change of procedure brought about by the IGC 
Mandate in relation to the Constitutional Treaty:  
A group of seven member states (i.e. the 
necessary quarter, cf. III-264) presents a 
proposal on minimum rules related to criminal 
law, which they know will never obtain the 
necessary majority in the Council. The 
European Commission may have been 
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working on a similar or related issue, trying to 
find a more consensual position. Yet, because 
of the difficulties of reaching a consensus 
among member states and the requirement to 
draft an extensive impact assessment – 
something member states are not obliged to do 
when tabling a draft – the Commission has not 
been able to present its own draft ahead of the 
‘avant-garde’ group.  
The member states’ proposal reaches the 
Council and suffers – as expected - the 
‘emergency brake’ by at least one member 
state. The ordinary legislative procedure is 
suspended and the European Council is unable 
to find a solution within four months. 
Following the new mechanism introduced by 
the IGC Mandate, the European Council can 
no longer request the initiating party to come 
up with a new, more balanced proposal. This 
is what the seven had been waiting for. They 
have managed in the meantime to convince 
two more member states to join their proposal 
and the minimum number of nine member 
states for the enhanced cooperation 
mechanism is achieved. The only thing left for 
them to do is to notify the EP, the Council and 
the Commission about their wish to establish 
enhanced cooperation among themselves. 
According to the modified rules, the normally 
required authorisation is hence “deemed to be 
granted”.
35 I n  t h i s  w a y ,  t h a n k s  t o  t h e  n e w  
‘emergency brake’ and enhanced cooperation 
mechanisms, the seven member states have 
succeeded in putting through an initially 
hopeless and unbalanced proposal with only 
the obligation to notify the EU institutions. 
Therefore, one of the more important consequences 
of the abandonment of the possibility for the 
European Council to request from the initiating 
party the submittal of a new draft will be the 
prevention of compromised solutions. It further 
enhances ‘enhanced cooperation’ and might limit 
the Commission’s role in the whole legislative 
process. The way in which the principle of loyalty 
among member states and in relation to the EU 
might translate in this respect, will be open to 
consideration.  
5. In the field of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, an exception is provided for measures 
concerning family law with cross-border 
implications. Here the unanimity rule and 
consultation procedure will remain applicable as 
was previously stipulated by article III-269 of the 
Constitutional Treaty. However, it was already 
foreseen that the Council may move certain aspects 
of family law to the ordinary legislative procedure. 
The IGC Mandate intends to significantly impede 
this possibility by making it subject to a notification 
of all national parliaments. If only one national 
parliament objects, the decision to move certain 
family law matters to the ordinary procedures shall 
not be adopted.
36
6. Further, provisions concerning passports, 
identification documents, residence permits and 
other related identification documents will be 
subject to unanimity and mere consultation of the 
European Parliament. While this procedural aspect 
had already been foreseen in the Constitutional 
Treaty, the IGC Mandate intends to create a 
systematically new positioning within the Treaties. 
According to para. 19 d) of the IGC Mandate, this 
provision shall be placed in the Title on the AFSJ, in 
the part dealing with “border controls” – “for the 
purpose of facilitating the rights of every citizen of 
the Union to move and reside freely (..).”. The 
transfer of these areas to the Title on AFSJ of the 
TFU constitutes a substantial move from the current 
contextualisation within the scope of Union 
citizenship.
37
7. Establishment and extension of the competences 
of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office will 
require unanimity in the Council and consent of the 
European Parliament. Whereas these exceptions to 
the ordinary procedures had been already stipulated 
in the Constitutional Treaty (article III-274), the 
IGC Mandate introduced yet another ‘enhanced 
cooperation mechanism’ allowing one third of 
member states to cooperate with each other in case 
the necessary unanimity inside the Council cannot 
be established and the European Council cannot 
provide a solution. It is quite remarkable, however, 
that this possibility is only foreseen with regard to 
the  establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and not for the extension of its 
competences. This raises a number of contentious 
questions. It will not only send a somewhat 
contradictory message that only a handful of 
member states cooperate to protect the EU’s entire 
financial interests by establishing the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, but these member states 
will henceforth not be able to extend the Office’s 
competences. 
8. In the field of ‘police cooperation’, i.e. 
“cooperation between police, customs and other 
specialized law enforcement services in relation to 
the prevention, detection and investigation of 
criminal offences” (article III-275) the most visible 
exception is again a confirmed opt-out from the UK 
and a possible opt-out from Ireland.
38 With regard 
to procedures the ordinary legislative procedure will 
apply as a general rule. However, as stated above, 
the right of initiative will be shared between the 
Commission and the member states. In addition, 
unanimity in the Council and mere consultation of 
the European Parliament will be required when it 
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comes to measures on operational cooperation 
between these authorities. It is furthermore with 
regard to this operational cooperation that the IGC 
Mandate once more introduced the possibility to 
establish enhanced cooperation in the case of no 
unanimity in the Council and after having submitted 
the matter to the European Council. Yet, at the same 
time another important ‘counter exception’ has been 
foreseen in relation to article III-275(3) which will 
stipulate that any operational cooperation “which 
constitutes a development of the Schengen acquis” 
will not fall under this special enhanced cooperation 
scheme. 
9. The position of the UK and Poland as regards the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights quite possibly 
constitutes one of the most controversial exceptions. 
First and foremost they will have a major impact on 
the way in which Freedom is going be guaranteed 
across the EU. Both countries have asked for a 
special positioning in respect of the applicability of 
the Charter to their national arenas. Poland 
presented a Unilateral Declaration according to 
which the Charter will not affect the right of the 
member states to enact legislation in the areas of 
public morality, family law, the protection of human 
dignity and the respect for human physical and 
moral integrity.
39
Further, a special protocol will be annexed to the 
Treaties on the position of the UK in respect of the 
Charter. According to Art. 1.1 of this Protocol:  
“The Charter does not extend the ability of the 
Court of Justice, or any court or tribunal of the 
United Kingdom, to find that the laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions, 
practices or action of the United Kingdom are 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights, 
freedoms and principles that it reaffirms”.
40
Further in paragraph 2 of the same provision, it 
states that nothing in the Charter creates justiciable 
rights applicable to the United Kingdom except in 
so far as the UK has provided for such rights in its 
national law. In addition, two other (unnamed) 
delegations have reserved their right to join this UK 
Protocol. 
10. Finally, with regard to the judicial control 
exercised by the ECJ, there is one exception 
foreseen in article III-377 of the Constitutional 
Treaty: The ECJ will not have jurisdiction to review 
the validity and proportionality of operations carried 
out by the police or other law-enforcement services 
of a member state or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon member states with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security. This however is an 
exception already maintained by the Constitutional 
Treaty and not the result of the European Council 
deliberations of June 2007. 
III. The Impact of ‘Exceptionalism’ and 
‘Differentiation’ in FSJ 
What are the possible implications of these 
exceptions, differentiation and deviations for EU 
JHA policies? How might they influence the 
articulation between EU governance and national 
sovereignty and the building of a common Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice and what is the 
impact on the individual affected by theses policies?  
In our opinion, the Reform Treaty will 
institutionalise a high degree of ‘exceptionalism’ in 
the AFSJ. The exceptions that have been highlighted 
above in section two will mainly aim at constraining 
the European integrationist processes over fields 
considered to be traditionally attached to national 
sovereignty prerogatives. Certain fields such as the 
maintenance of law and order, internal security, 
cooperation and coordination among national 
security authorities, passports and other 
identification documents, family law will remain 
outside the institutional renewal. They will continue 
to be subject to the intergovernmental method of 
cooperation, characterised by unanimity voting or 
even being beyond the scope of the EU. 
In addition, the IGC Mandate fosters 
‘differentiation’ as regards European cooperation on 
policies related to an AFSJ. The ‘differentiation’ 
will translate in an Area where transnational 
cooperation over Freedom, Security and Justice will 
be subject to a complex matrix of ‘speeds’. Some 
areas such as the harmonisation of criminal law, 
operational cooperation of police forces or the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office will be subject to emergency brakes and/or 
enhanced cooperation. In the field of data 
protection, the crucial innovation of the 
Constitutional Treaty will be reversed and the 
differentiation of protection linked to certain policy 
fields will be maintained, albeit in a less visible 
manner (see above I.9.3). 
Differentiation as a product of ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ in all these areas may lead to the 
instauration of various Areas of Freedom(s), 
Security(ies) and Justice(s). It may put an end to the 
political project of having a sole and unique Area 
where a common level of Freedom, Security and 
Justice is guaranteed. Yet it is this common level 
that provides the justification for EU-specific 
supranational (as opposed to mere international) 
cooperation and provides the basis for the 
establishment of mutual trust, necessary, for 
instance for the application of the EU principle of 
mutual recognition. Under the new structures, there 
is a real danger of competing areas and dispersed 
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levels of Europeanisation and integration as regards 
the dimensions of FSJ.  
The perception that ‘enhanced cooperation’ is one-
dimensional; that a group of avant-garde member 
states goes ‘ahead’ and the other more reluctant 
ones follow as soon as they perceive this ‘ahead’ is 
the right way, might turn out to be illusory in the 
long-run. Who guarantees that ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ might not lead to a situation in which a 
group of nine member states goes ‘ahead’, but 
another group of nine decides to take a bend in 
another direction, leaving another group of nine 
behind that finally decides to move ‘enhanced 
backwards’?  
Such scenarios might not only hamper the political 
project of achieving a common AFSJ; they might 
also impair the effectiveness of JHA policies. In the 
end, it is national officials, police forces, judges, 
prosecutors, etc. who must make use of the 
cooperation mechanism. Yet, already now, mutual 
legal assistance is a long way from being a top-
priority in every day business at practical member 
state level. With multiple speeds, things will get 
considerably more difficult as national officials will 
– in every single case - have to assess which 
possible cooperation partner belongs to which 
flexible group of member states. In the end, ever 
changing ‘flexibility’ can reach a degree of 
complexity that may paralyse the everyday 
cooperation of national authorities. 
While acknowledging that some of the ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ elements were already been contained 
in the Constitutional Treaty, the IGC Mandate has 
considerably exacerbated the dangers inherent in 
‘flexibility’ and ‘multiple speeds’. Not only does the 
IGC Mandate enhance ‘enhanced cooperation’, as 
exemplified above in the case scenario on criminal 
law, the most crucial difference between 2004 and 
2007 is that differentiation and exception have now 
even been allowed for the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. An unrestrained application of the Charter - 
as foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty – would 
have constituted the only brace able to keep drifting 
“Areas of Freedoms, Securities and Justices” 
together. It would have been a most important 
mechanism for ensuring equal treatment of all 
inhabitants of the AFSJ throughout the EU in 
respect of JHA policies. 
Differing status of individuals depending on the 
location within the Areas of Freedoms, Securities 
and Justices, in fact gives rise to the most serious 
concerns. Which safeguards will apply, for instance, 
if Eurojust, together with an enhanced cooperation 
group of member states, investigates a cross-border 
case involving a British citizen arrested in Mallorca 
on holiday? Will this British suspect be treated 
differently because the UK decided not to join the 
enhanced cooperation group? And how will the opt-
out of the Fundamental Rights Charter translate in 
such a case?  
With the Charter of Fundamental Rights limited and 
the risk of drifting in the Areas of Freedom, Security 
and Justice increased, it will now be for the 
European Commission and the European Parliament 
to play a seminal role in ensuring the coherence and 
sustainability of the project of creating an AFSJ in 
the EU. Furthermore, with the ECJ’s competencies 
increased, this institution will have to be even more 
instrumental in ensuring the solidity of a common 
EU approach in these fields and guaranteeing the 
rule of law. The Court will have to ensure that the 
principle of dispersion and differentiation will not 
undermine the building of a common space where 
Freedom, Security and Justice are guaranteed 
equally across the entire EU. 
Furthermore, in order to consolidate human rights 
protection throughout the AFSJ, also with regard to 
EU institutions, bodies and agencies, the ECHR will 
have to fill the gap opened up by some member 
states’ opt-out of the Fundamental Rights Charter. 
In this respect, the swift accession of the EU to the 
ECHR is crucial. 
Finally, thorough attention must been given to 
national parliaments. They should make cautious 
and wise use of their strengthened position as 
regards subsidiarity, proportionality, and use of the 
new family law ‘passarelle’ in order to avoid 
increasing the risk of differentiation. In particular, 
they should refrain from weakening the role of the 
EP in the European integration processes; national 
parliaments should not conceive of themselves as a 
third EU chamber. While the engagement of 
national parliaments in the legislative machinery of 
instruments related to Freedom, Security and Justice 
is crucial for a close involvement of the people of 
Europe, careful attention will need to be paid in 
order to guarantee efficiency and effectiveness in 
the decision-making processes.  
VI. Conclusions and Suggestions for 
Policy-Makers 
This paper has provided an overview of the major 
innovations that are to be expected from the new 
Reform Treaty for the EU Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice and has assessed possible 
implications. 
We have argued that the IGC Mandate has provided 
a mostly positive response to some of the main 
complaints that have often been put forward in 
respect of the institutional and decision-making 
mechanisms. The institutional fragmentation will be 
over, along with a large number of its negative 
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externalities. The abolition of the Pillar duality over 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice will lead 
to increasing legal certainty, a set of uniform legal 
acts, stronger involvement of the European 
Parliament in the decision-making process, as well 
as the widening of the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review 
and interpret these policies. This will facilitate the 
development of more comprehensive, legitimate, 
efficient, transparent and democratic responses to 
the dilemmas posed by the Europeanisation 
processes and the creation of a common AFSJ. 
In spite of this, we welcome the fact that many of 
the aspects provided by the Constitutional Treaty 
have been retained. To lessen the perils inherent in 
the likely new structures, we conclude with the 
following considerations: 
1. Notwithstanding the theoretical possibilities of 
‘moving ahead’, member states should always aim 
to reach a common consensus among all member 
states. This should be and should remain their first 
obligation, preventing any abuse of the enhanced 
cooperation mechanisms.
41
Nevertheless, the Mandate has also increased the 
possibilities of enhanced cooperation, granted opt-
outs and brought about a limited scope for the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. We have argued 
that this aspect of the ‘innovations’ might actually 
undermine the construction of a common AFSJ and 
its sustainability as a plausible political project for 
an enlarged EU. Allowing the possibility of too 
many ‘speeds’ going in too many different 
directions might have helped to end the pillarisation 
but may create an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice prone to ‘differentiation’ and 
‘exceptionalism’; the exception might well become 
the norm. 
2. On the other hand, sceptical member states should 
refrain from abusing the ‘emergency brake’. A train 
in which someone constantly pulls the red lever will 
not only arrive late, it will suffer materially in the 
long-run. This is why the abuse of emergency 
facilities is a crime in many member states. 
3. With their competencies strengthened, it will be 
mainly for the European Commission, Parliament 
and the ECJ to keep a careful eye on the common 
interest, refraining from everything that might 
stimulate the drifting apart of the common, the 
single Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
4. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, together with 
the ECHR – once the EU has acceded – should be 
conceived as instruments that stabilise the position 
of the individual and guarantee equal treatment, 
thereby constituting a necessary brace for drifting 
Areas. 
Too much ‘flexibility’, we have argued, might lead 
to too much complexity, paralysing the practical 
cooperation of national authorities at ‘ground level’. 
Differing Areas of Freedoms, Securities and Justices 
may furthermore endanger the status and legal 
safeguards of EU citizens that might find 
themselves caught up between the gaps and rifts of 
this patchwork. 
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